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Abstract
India has witnessed a remarkable catch-up by the historically disadvantaged scheduled castes
and tribes (SC/STs) towards non-SC/ST levels in their education attainment levels, occupation
choices as well as wages during the period 1983-2012. Using a heterogenous agent, multi-sector
model we show that sectoral productivity growth during this period can explain 75 percent of
the observed wage convergence between the castes. Inter-sectoral net flows of workers are key as
they account for 3/4 of the predicted convergence. Absent these net flows, the caste wage gaps
would have marginally widened. Selection effects, while present in these net flows, account for
just a quarter of the predicted wage convergence. We also find that affirmative action policies
that reduced skilling costs for SC/STs may have reduced the levels of the caste wage gaps at
all times but played a limited role in accounting for the dynamics of the wage gap. Growth was
key for the dynamic wage convergence.
JEL Classification: J6, O1
Keywords: Castes, convergence, labor
1 Introduction
A perennial challenge of managing the development process is to balance the macroeconomic goals of
growth and development with the microeconomic goals of equity and distributional fairness. These
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Panagariya, and seminar participants at the IGC conference in Delhi, Pennsylvania State University, FRB Philadel-
phia and the University of Maryland for helpful comments and discussions. Thanks to Sudipta Ghosh for providing
research assistance. We also thank the India Growth Center network for providing funding to support this research.
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challenges often come to the fore during periods of rapid economic changes in growing economies.
An example of this phenomenon is India over the past 30 years. This period has witnessed a rapid
takeoff of the Indian economy with average annual growth rates doubling relative to the pre-reform
phase. What have been the distributional consequences of the growth take-off? Did growth lift all
groups or were there tradeoffs? What are the mechanisms that linked the two?
We approach the issue by focussing on the experience in India of Scheduled Castes and Sched-
uled Tribes (SC/STs) – an historically underprivileged section of Indian society.1 These groups
experienced a rapid catch-up towards non-SC/ST levels with the mean wage gap shrinking by 15
percentage points and the median wage gap declining by an even more striking 20 percentage points
between 1983 and 2012. This wage convergence was accompanied by convergence in education at-
tainment levels, occupation choices, and consumption levels (see Hnatkovska et al. (2012)).2
The goal of the paper is to assess the roles of growth and affirmative action programs in driving
the declining economic gaps between non-SC/STs and SC/STs. Constitutionally mandated affir-
mative action programs that carved out reserved seats in higher education and legislative houses for
SC/STs have been a key feature of public policy in India since the 1950s. How important have these
protections been in accounting for the changes in the observed caste disparities since 1983 relative
to the role of the faster productivity and economic growth in India after 1991? Did faster growth
succeed in breaking down historical barriers to entry of SC/STs into higher-skill occupations?
To answer these questions, we first examine data on the evolution of caste gaps between SC/STs
and non-SC/STs in education attainment rates broken down by age and birth cohorts. A key finding
from this exercise is that caste education gaps within birth cohorts remained relatively unchanged
till 1993-94 after which there was a decrease. This pattern characterizes most of the economically
active cohorts, including the older ones. We interpret this as evidence that is suggestive of people
perceiving educational attainment as a key determinant of changing employment.
As a next step, we conduct a statistical decomposition of the change in the overall wage gap
between non-SC/STs and SC/STs during 1983-2012. We do so by noting that in a multi-sector
economy, caste wage gaps could change either due to changes in the employment distribution of
castes across sectors or due to changes in sectoral caste wage gaps or some combination of the two.
1SC/STs comprise a list of castes that have been listed in a schedule of the Indian constitution as being historically
disadvantaged and consequently eligible for affirmative action programs in higher education, public sector jobs and
political representation. Crucially, caste identities are inherited by birth and hence immutable over time. Moreover,
the extent of reservations for SC/STs have also remained constant over time.
2There has also been sharp convergence in the intergenerational mobility rates in these three indicators (see
Hnatkovska et al. (2013)).
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Our decomposition exercise reveals that the relatively faster entry of SC/STs into the service sector
during this period was the most important driver of the caste wage convergence.
Based on this evidence, we develop a three-sector model (agriculture, manufacturing and ser-
vices) of an economy with two types of agents (non-SC/STs and SC/STs) and non-homothetic
preferences. Employment in the non-agricultural sectors requires additional skills beyond innate
ability. Agents differ in their abilities and their costs of acquiring skills to work in the non-
agricultural sectors. Based on their abilities, the skill-acquisition costs and the sectoral returns to
labor, agents sort into employment in the three sectors. This endogenously generates caste gaps in
employment and wages in each sector as well as an overall caste wage gap.
After calibrating the model to match the sectoral caste gaps in employment and wages in 1983,
we conduct a sequence of quantitative experiments to examine the importance of productivity
growth and skill acquisition costs in inducing the observed changes in the caste gaps during 1983-
2012. Our experiments yield three main results. First, sectoral productivity growth during 1983-
2012 accounts for 75 percent of the percentage decline in the caste wage gap during this period.
Second, the observed sectoral labor productivity shocks induce dynamics of sectoral labor shares
and sectoral prices in the model that reproduce their patterns in the data. Specifically, the model
induces contractions in the labor shares of agriculture and manufacturing along with an expansion
of the labor share in services. Crucially, the model predicts a decline in the prices of manufacturing
and services relative to agriculture, a feature that also matches the data. We view these aggregate
features of the model, including its structural transformations predictions, as indicative of the
model being a good fit to the data.3
Using counterfactual experiments we show that the key contributor to the caste convergence is
the endogenous re-sorting of workers into sectors induced by the differential sectoral productivity
growths. Absent this re-sorting, the overall caste wage gap would likely have marginally increased
as productivity growth tended to be higher in sectors that were historically over-represented by non-
SC/STs. Consistent with the statistical decomposition exercise, we find that the wage convergence
in the model is accounted for mostly by the decrease in the caste employment gap in services.
There are two aspects of the worker re-sorting in the model that are potentially important. The
first is just the net movement of workers across sectors. The second is the selection by ability of the
workers that choose to move. We find that 3/4 of the wage convergence in the baseline model is due
3Interestingly, while the model allows for non-homothetic preferences, our quantitative exercises reveal that it is
differential sectoral productivity growth that accounts for the sectoral dynamics of prices and the structural trans-
formation in the model. Non-homothetic preferences, by themselves, imply counterfactual sectoral price movements.
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to net flows of worker across sectors. Selection effects quantitatively account for just a quarter of
the wage convergence in the model. We interpret this result as being consistent with the statistical
decomposition exercise which attributed most of the convergence to just inter-sectoral labor flows.
Third, we assess the role of affirmative action programs by varying the costs of acquiring skills
for the two groups. In the baseline calibration, the skilling costs of SC/STs are lower than that for
non-SC/STs. We view this to be the consequence of reservations for SC/STs. When we equalize
the cost of acquiring skills across castes while leaving all other parameters in the baseline model
unchanged, the caste wage gap rises by 21 percent in 1983 and by 11 percent in 2012 relative to the
gap under the baseline calibration. This suggests to us that affirmative action was likely important
in lowering the levels of the caste wage gaps.
The counterfactual experiments on skilling costs also suggest that affirmative action likely did
not materially affect the dynamics of caste wage gaps between 1983 and 2012. The predicted
decrease in the wage gap during 1983-2012 in the baseline case where reservations exist throughout,
is 8.1 percent. When reservations are removed in the model by equalizing skilling costs across castes
at all times, the same productivity growth causes the caste wage gap to decline by an even greater
15 percent during 1983-2012. The higher rate of decrease without reservations is due to low “base”
effects: without reservations, SC/STs localize in the low wage agriculture sector which reduces
their 1983 wages. This base effect raises the implied growth rate of SC/ST wages in 2012 when
higher non-agricultural sectoral productivities induce some higher ability SC/STs to switch to the
higher wage manufacturing sector. Most importantly however, growth appears to drive a reduction
in caste wage gaps, with or without reservations.
Overall, our results suggest that the rapid growth take-off in India over the past three decades
has been the key factor driving the dramatic narrowing of the historical economic disparities faced
by SC/STs. Growth appears to have impacted the wage gaps by inducing a re-sorting of workers
across sectors. Pre-existing reservations for SC/STs in higher education that were enshrined into the
Indian constitution, probably played a role in reducing the level of the caste wage gaps. However,
these reservations appeared to have had limited effects on the dynamics of the caste wage gaps
between 1983 and 2012.4 Rather, the results suggest that growth succeeded in breaking down
historical barriers to entry into some occupations for SC/STs.
The paper is related to three distinct bodies of work. The first is the work on castes in India
4We should note that the focus of the model is on the reservation policies for higher education. There also exist
reservations for SC/STs in public sector employment. However, given the limited number and scope of public sector
jobs, we have chosen to focus on the education side of affirmative action programs in this paper.
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and their impact on economic outcomes. Aside from the contributions of Hnatkovska et al. (2012).
and Hnatkovska et al. (2013) cited above, notable other contributors to this literature are Banerjee
and Knight (1985), Madheswaran and Attewell (2007) and Borooah (2005) who examined the
discrimination against SC/STs in labor markets in urban India. On a related theme, Ito (2009)
studied labor market discrimination in two Indian states – Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Exploring
the theme of castes as networks, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) and Munshi and Rosenzweig
(2016) show how castes induce network effects that impact labor mobility, education choices and
employment.5
A second literature that is related to our work is the extensive work on structural transformation
of countries along the development path wherein countries gradually switch their economic focus
from agriculture to non-agricultural sectors. This is a voluminous literature that spans both empir-
ical and theoretical work. Key contributions in this are are Matsuyama (1992), Kongsamut et al.
(2001), Ngai and Pissarides (2007) and Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008). An excellent overview can
be found in Herrendorf et al. (2014) who describe both the empirical regularities as well as the theo-
retical explanations for this phenomenon. Our paper shares the focus on structural transformation
with these papers but differs in its focus on the distributional effects of this transformation.
Our work also relates to the literature that has examined the sources of productivity differences
between countries. Two lines of research in this broad tent are closely connected with this paper.
The first is the work on misallocation of talent by Hsieh et al. (2019) who analyze the consequences
of misallocating talent by gender and race on productivity and growth in the USA. We share their
interest in the implications of misallocating labor across sectors due to discrimination or other
factors. A second branch of work in this area has focused on the role of occupation selection in
accounting for income differences between rural and urban workers (see Young (2013)) and between
agricultural and non-agricultural workers (see Lagakos and Waugh (2013)). This list is illustrative
rather than being exhaustive.
The next section describes the key facts on caste economic gaps and structural transformation
in India. Section 3 conducts a decomposition exercise to determine the statistical drivers of the
caste wage convergence while Section 4 presents the model and some analytical results. Section
6 presents the calibration and quantitative results as well as the counterfactual experiments. The
5Another paper that is related to our work is Banerjee and Munshi (2004). They examined the differences between
entrants belonging to the incumbent traditional community of Gounders in the garment industry in Tirupur in India
in the early 1990s relative to entrants from other communities. They found evidence of sharp catch-up of capital and
output of outsider firms to the levels of entrants from the Gounder community.
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last section concludes.
2 Empirical regularities
Our data comes from different sources. The primary data source is the National Sample Survey
(NSS) rounds 38 (1983), 43 (1987-88), 50 (1993-94), 55 (1999-2000), 61 (2003-04), 66 (2009-10) and
68 (2011-12).6 The NSS provides household-level data on approximately 600,000 individuals on
education, employment, consumption, and wages as well as other social characteristics. We consider
individuals between the ages 16-65 belonging to male-headed households who were not enrolled full
time in any educational degree or diploma. The sample is restricted to those individuals who
provided their 4-digit industry of employment information as well as their education information.7
Our focus is on full-time working individuals who are defined as those that worked at least 2.5 days
per week. This selection leaves us with a working sample of around 165,000-182,000 individuals,
depending on the survey round. The wage data is more limited. This is primarily due to the
prevalence of self-employed individuals in rural India who do not report wage income. As a result,
the sub-sample with wage data is limited to about 48,000 individuals on average across rounds.
Details on the data are contained in the Data Appendix to this paper.
We start by reporting some aggregate facts regarding the education and wage gaps between
SC/STs and non-SC/STs since 1983. These facts are extensions of the results reported in Hnatkovska
et al. (2012). Figure 1 reports the wage gaps between the castes. Panel (a) shows the mean wage
gaps between the groups across the NSS rounds while panel (b) shows the corresponding median
gaps. The solid lines depict the unconditional wage gaps while the dashed lines show the wage
gaps after controlling for the age characteristics of workers.8 Both plots reveal an unambiguous
pattern of wage convergence between the two groups since 1983, with the mean wage gap declining
by 10.5% and the median gap falling by 14%.
Next we examine the education patterns of the two groups during this period. Figure 2 shows
the relative gaps in the years of education between non-SC/STs and SC/STs. Panel (a) of the
Figure shows the gaps for different age cohorts while panel (b) shows the corresponding gaps in
6The 68th NSS round is the latest available and released by the Indian government.
7We also consider a narrower sample in which we restrict the sample to only males and find that our results
remain robust.
8Specifically, to obtain unconditional wage gaps we estimated an OLS regression (for mean) and a RIF regression
(for median) of log wages on a constant and an SC/ST dummy. The conditional gaps are computed from the same
regression with age and age squared controls.
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Notes: Panel (a) of this Figure presents the mean wage gaps between SC/STs and non-SC/STs (expressed
as non-SCST/SCST) from the 1983 to the 2011-12 NSS rounds. Panel (b) shows the corresponding median
wage gaps (non-SCST/SCST). The dashed lines in the two panels show the computed wage gaps after
controlling for the age characteristics of workers while the solid lines are the gaps without such controls.
the average years of schooling by birth cohorts. Both panels reveal a pattern of convergence in
education attainment rates between the two groups. Remarkably, caste education gaps even within
older birth cohorts appear to have shrunk after 1991-92. In fact, the education convergence trends
are even sharper than the trends in wage convergence.
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Notes: Panel (a) of this Figure shows the relative gap in average years of education (non-SCST/SCST)
across the NSS rounds for different age cohorts while Panel (b) shows the gaps by birth cohorts.
Given the trends in Figures 1 and 2, the natural question to ask is how much of the wage
convergence between the two groups is due to convergence in education attainment. Hnatkovska
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et al. (2012) examined precisely this question and found that most of the wage convergence is, in
fact, due to education convergence.
These trends, while interesting by themselves, raise the logical question about the deeper reasons
behind the observed convergence between the groups during this period. While there may have
been multiple factors operating simultaneously, in this paper we focus on the two biggest changes
that occurred in the Indian economy during this period. As is well known, this period – 1983
to 2012 – was a period of major changes in economic policy which was accompanied by a sharp
economic take-off in India. There were large scale trade and industrial reforms carried out in the
mid-1980s and in the 1990s. Economic growth in India took off from an average of around 3 percent
in the period between 1950 and 1985 to consistently being above 6 percent by the end of the 1990s.
Second, this period was also marked by a very sharp structural transformation of the economy.
Before proceeding, it is useful to document some of the key data facts related to the structural
transformation of the economy since the early 1980s. In order to present the structural trans-
formation facts, we combine 4-digit industry categories in the data into three broad categories:
Agriculture, Manufacturing, and Services. See Appendix 9.1 for more details on the industry
grouping.












































Notes: Panel (a) of this Figure presents the distribution of workforce across three industry categories for
different NSS rounds. Panel (b) presents distribution of output (measured in constant 1980-81 prices)
across three industry categories.
Figure 3 shows that the period 1983-2012 was marked by a gradual contraction in the traditional
agricultural sector while the service sector expanded both in terms of its share of output as well as
employment (there was an expansion in the manufacturing sector too but much more tepid relative
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to that of the service sector).
This process of structural transformation coincided with rapid growth in productivity at the
aggregate and sectoral levels. Figure 4 reports labor productivity in each sector. Panel (a) is
measured as output per worker computed from the national accounts data, while panel (b) reports
the sectoral labor productivity numbers that are reported in the KLEMS dataset for India. All the
series are normalized by their values in 1983, so they all start at unity.
Figure 4: Sectoral labor productivity measures
(a) (b)
Notes: Panel (a) of this Figure presents labor productivity, measured as GDP (in constant 1980-81 prices)
divided by number of workers in each sector. Panel (b) shows the sectoral labor productivity computed
from the KLEMS database for India. All series are normalized by their 1983 values.
Figure 4 shows that productivity growth across the three sectors, especially in the non-agricultural
sectors, is a feature of both the national income accounts and KLEMS data. Both datasets also
reveal a common rank-ordering of sectoral labor productivity growth during 1983-2012: manufac-
turing grew the fastest followed by services with agriculture being the slowest growing sector.9
Figure 5 reports mean years of education and median wages in the three sectors for various
survey rounds. The figures reveal a dramatic increase in both education attainments and median
wages in India during 1983-2012 period. Importantly, the figures show that the rank order of edu-
cational attainment and wages across the sectors in descending order were services, manufacturing
and agriculture. This will be important for the calibration of our model later.
So, how did this overall transformation of the economy affect the two groups? Figure 6 reports
9Quantitatively, the KLEMS data reports lower productivity growth for all three sectors relative to the numbers
computed from the national income accounts. In the calibration section below, where we examine the effect of
productivity growth on caste gaps, we shall examine the robustness of our quantitative results to these alternative
measures of productivity growth.
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Median wages across sectors
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Notes: Panel (a) of this Figure presents average years of education of workers employed in each of the
three sectors. Panel (b) reports median wages in the three sectors.
the industry distribution of working individuals among SC/STs and non-SC/STs, and the relative
gaps in this distribution. Clearly, SC/STs were and remain more likely to be employed in agriculture
and other farming activities than non-SC/STs. However the gap narrowed somewhat in the last
ten years of our sample. The second largest industry of employment for both social groups is
services, whose share has risen steadily over time. Interestingly, services also exhibits the sharpest
convergence pattern between non-SC/STs and SC/STs. The relative gap between non-SC STs and
SC/STs in employment shares in services has shrunk from 60 percent in 1983 to 21 percent in
2012. Manufacturing shows relatively little changes in the employment shares of the two groups
over time.
Figures 7 reports the relative gaps in education attainments and median wages between non-
SC/STs and SC/STs employed in each sector. The education gaps have narrowed significantly over
time between the two caste groups. Median wage gaps on the other hand declined in Services,
stayed unchanged in Manufacturing, but widened somewhat in Agriculture.
To summarize the data features documented above, the period 1983-2012 was characterized by
high aggregate growth in the economy, rising output per worker in all three sectors and productivity
growth across the sectors. Concurrently, there was a gradual transformation of the economy that
was underway as well with services becoming a larger share of the economy both in terms of output
and employment while the corresponding agriculture shares shrank.
In terms of the caste distributions, both SC/STs and non-SC/STs exited from agriculture and
moved into service sector employment during this period. The education gap between the castes
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Gap in workforce distribution across Ind.
Agri_gap Manuf_gap Serv_gap
(a) (b)
Notes: Panel (a) of this Figure presents the distribution of workforce across the three industry categories
for different NSS rounds. The left set of bars on each Figure refers to non-SC/STs, while the right set
is for SC/STs. Panel (b) presents relative gaps in the distribution of non-SC/STs relative to SC/STs
across three industry categories.
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Caste wage gaps across sectors
(a) (b)
Notes: Panel (a) of this Figure presents relative gap in years of education between non-SC/STs and
SC/STs. Panel (b) presents the ratio of non-SC/STs median wages to SC/STs median wages.
declined in all three sectors. Moreover, while wages were converging overall between the castes,
there were interesting contrasts in the patterns across the sectors. The wage convergence was strong
in the service sector. The agricultural sector however saw a divergence in wages between the castes.
Interestingly, the wage gaps in the manufacturing sector remained relatively stable over this period.
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3 Decomposing the Wage Convergence
We saw above that the period 1983-2012 witnessed changes in the sectoral employment distribution
of SC/STs which occurred at different rates than that for non-SC/STs. The period also saw changes
in the sectoral wages of SC/STs relative to non-SC/STs.
How much of the wage convergence was due to convergence in the sectoral employment distri-
butions? How much was due to differential movements in the sectoral wages of the castes? This
would provide guidance for the margins to focus on in building a structural explanation. In this
section we conduct precisely this kind of decomposition using a three-sector structure.
3.1 Notation
We use the following notation for our sectoral decomposition exercise:
Let s denote SC/STs and n denote non-SC/STs individuals. Also let a,m, h denote, respectively,
agriculture, manufacturing and services.
• W j,k: Average wage of caste j = s, n in sector k = a,m, h
• W j : Average wage of caste j = s, n
• W k: Average wage of sector k = a,m, h
• ℓj,k: Employment of caste j in sector k




j,k : Share of sector k in total employment of caste j
• ∆W = W
n
W s
: Overall caste wage gap
• ∆W k = W
n,k
W s,k
: Caste wage gap in sector k
• ∆Sk = S
n,k
Ss,k
: Sectoral caste labor gap
3.2 Decomposition of the wage gap
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The expression above shows that the change in the overall wage gap between dates t− 1 and t can
be decomposed into changes in (a) the three sectoral wage gaps between castes; and (b) the three
sectoral labor share gaps between the castes. These are the terms in the first bracket on the right
hand side of the equation above. The terms in the second bracket on the right hand side of this
equation are weights on these sectoral changes.
The decomposition above allows us to quantitatively assess the individual contribution of each
of the six margins identified above to the overall wage convergence. Table 1 reports these results.






∆SA 0.98 0.98 0.895
∆SM 1.09 1.00 0.895
∆SH 0.76 0.88 0.895
∆WA 1.04 1.00 0.895
∆WM 0.95 0.98 0.895
∆WH 0.92 0.95 0.895
Notes: 1. Each row of this table shows the change in
a specific sectoral caste gap between 1983 and 2012 as
well as the predicted change in the overall caste wage
gap if the other five sectoral caste gaps had remained
unchanged during this period.
Column 1 of Table 1 lists the caste gaps in sectoral labor shares and sectoral mean wages. The
second column reports the actual changes in these caste gaps between 1983 and 2012. The third
column reports the predicted counterfactual change in the overall caste wage gap if the caste gap
for that row was the only gap to have changed between 1983 and 2012. The last column compares
this counterfactual change with the actual change in the overall caste mean wage gap equal to
10.5%.
As an example, the 0.98 entry in column 3 next to ∆SA indicates that relative caste labor share
gap in Agriculture declined by 2 percent between 1983 and 2012. The other two entries for the row
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labelled ∆SA show that while the overall relative caste wage gap declined by 10.5 percent in the
data between 1983 and 2012 (last column), the wage gap would have declined by just 2 percent
had the caste labor gap in agriculture been the only gap to have changed during this period.
The main takeaway from the Table is that the role of convergence in the caste labor gap in
services was key for the overall wage convergence. The measured decline in the services labor share
gap alone reduces the overall wage gap by 12 percent between 1983 and 2012. In comparison, the
other sectoral caste gaps had relatively minor effects on the overall wage gap. Consequently, any
structural explanation for the observed wage convergence has to generate a big convergence in the
caste labor gap in services.
4 Model
We now ask whether an aggregate productivity shock can have a differential impact on the two
groups and cause the education and wage gaps between the castes to fall? If so, what are the
conditions under which that can happen? Would such an environment also induce sectoral outcomes
that are consistent with the facts that we just outlined above, in particular the large changes in
the caste labor gap in services?
Consider a one-period lived closed economy that is inhabited by a continuum of agents of
measure L. A measure S of these agents belong to caste s (for scheduled castes and tribes or














c̄ is the minimum level of consumption of the a good (which we think of as the agricultural good).
As before, we shall refer to the a good as the agricultural good, the m good as the manufacturing
good and the h good as the high skill good.
Each agent i is born with one unit of labor time that is supplied inelastically to the market
and an endowment of ability ei. The ability distribution is caste specific. So, for agents belonging
to caste s the ability ei is drawn from an i.i.d. process that follows the cumulative distribution
function Gs (e) , e ∈ [es, ēs]. Similarly, for agents belonging to caste n the ability type is drawn
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from an i.i.d. process summarized by the distribution function Gn (e) , e ∈ [en, ēn].
10
Ability is a productive input in both production and in skill acquisition. An agent can work
in either of the three sectors. Sector a does not require any training or special skills, hence agents
who choose to work in this sector can supply their labor endowment to this sector as is. Working
in sector m requires some special, sector-specific skill. Agent i can acquire this skill by spending
fmji units of the sector m good where j = s, n denotes the caste to which agent i belongs. This
specification allows the skill acquisition costs to be caste specific. Similarly, to work in sector h the
worker i needs to acquire a different skill level which can be acquired by expending fhji units of the
m good. Throughout the paper we shall use the sectoral identifiers a,m, h to refer to agriculture,
manufacturing and services, respectively.
In the following we shall make the following assumptions regarding the costs of acquiring skills:
Assumption 1 : fkji = f
k
j (ei) = f̄
k
j + f (ei) ,
∂f
∂ei
≤ 0, j = s, n, k = m,h
Assumption 2 : f̄hj > f̄
m
j , j = n, s
Assumption 1 says that skilling costs have two components. The first, f̄kj , is a fixed cost that is
specific to sector and caste. The second component, f (ei), is decreasing in the ability level of the
individual. Assumption 2 says that the fixed component of the skilling cost for sector-h is greater
than that for sector-m for both castes. This assumption reflects the data pattern in Figure 5 where
we showed that education attainment rates were the highest for workers employed in the services
sector. Since the second component of the sectoral skilling cost, f(ei), is independent of sector,
Assumption 2 also implies that fhj (ei) > f
m
j (ei) for all e and j = n, s.
There are thus two sources of differences across castes: the distribution of abilities, Gj(e), j =
n, s; and the sectoral skilling costs fkj , j = n, s, and k = m,h. We shall expand on the implications
of these differences below.
The technologies for producing the three goods are all linear in the labor input. In particular,
an unskilled worker with ability ei supplying one unit of labor time to sector a produces
yai = Aei
10The evolution of these supports of the distributions is clearly a dynamic issue and endogenous to time and
investment decisions regarding education that are made by families. We intend to address these issues more fully in
future work.
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An m-sector worker with ability ei produces the manufacturing good m according to
ymi = Mei
Lastly, an h−sector worker with ability ei produces the high skill good according to
yhi = Hei
Note that labor supply is inelastic and indivisible. So each worker supplies one unit of labor time
to whichever sector he/she works in.









yai , pm (y
m
i − f





The subscript i refers to household i with ability ei. Recall that each worker will be working in
only one sector.
Household optimality conditions and optimal consumption of th three goods are derived in
subsection 9.2 of Section 9.
4.1 Occupation and Skill Choice
The decisions about which occupation to choose and what skill level to acquire are joint in this
model since skills are matched uniquely to sectors. Thus, an agent of caste j with ability ei will







Aei ≥ phHei − pmf
h
j (ei)
where pm is the relative price of good m and ph is the relative price of good h. Throughout we
shall use good a as the numeraire. In addition, an agent who chooses to get skilled will choose to
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work in sector h rather than sector m if and only if
phHei − pmf
h





























The right hand sides of these conditions are the relative gains from working in sector m or h while
the left hand sides are the relative costs. Crucially, the right hand side variables are aggregate
variables that private agents take as given. The left hand sides, on the other hand, are individual































H −M, j = s, n (4.3)
where we have used the definitions zmj (e) ≡
fmj (e)
e




Lemma 4.1. All individuals i ∈ caste j = n, s with ability ei prefer employment in sector-m to
employment in sector-a if ei ≥ ê
m
j ; employment in sector-h to sector-a if ei ≥ ê
h
j ; and employment
in sector-h to sector-m if ei ≥ ẽ
h
j .
Proof. The statements follow directly from Assumptions 1 and 2 which imply that zkj (e) and z
h
j (e)−
zmj (e) are both decreasing in e for k = m,h and j = s, n.
11
Note that since the right hand sides of equations (4.1) and (4.2) are not caste specific (they are
11Since zhj (e)− z
m
j (e) > 0 for all e ∈ [ej , ēj ], if
ph
pm
H < M then employment in sector-m would dominate sector-h
employment for all ability types. In our analysis below we will focus on the case ph
pm
H > M to ensure a positive
measure of employment in sector-h.
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aggregate variables), the threshold conditions also imply that
zms (ê
m





















4.1.1 Mapping Abilities to Sectors
How do agents get distributed across sectors in this economy? This depends on the relative rank
ordering of the three thresholds êmj , ê
m
j , and ẽ
h. In order to characterize the sectoral distribution
of abilities, there are two possible configurations of sectoral productivities and skilling costs to
consider: (i) phH
pm
≥ M and zhj (e) ≥ z
m
j (e); and (ii)
phH
pm
< M and zhj (e) ≥ z
m
j (e). Assumption 2
eliminates the other two possibilities associated with zhj (e) < z
m
j (e). Case (ii) is inconsistent with
an interior solution for h̃ in equation 4.3 above. This reduces the set of cases to (i) above.
It is easy to check that one can have êh ≷ êm when phH
pm
≥ M and zhj (e) ≥ z
m
j (e). Given this
ambiguity, the following lemma is useful for characterizing the different possibilities:























Proof. With no loss of generality, suppose êmj < ê
h
j . We first show that ẽ







j . From equation 4.3
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H−M from equations 4.1 and equation 4.2, which is a contradiction. The




j leads to a contradiction by a similar logic.








j ). Since e < ê
h






H − zhj (e). Moreover, e > ê
m





. But, e > ẽhj implies that
ph
pm
H − zhj (e) > M − z
m
j (e), which is a contradiction.








j ). Here, ê
m










and M − zmj (e) <
A
pm
. But e < ẽhj implies that
ph
pm
H − zhj (e) < M − z
m
j (e), which is a
contradiction.
Lemma 4.2 describes the relationship between the three thresholds in the model. Specifically,









Since the model structure can give rise to êh ≷ êm, the following Proposition characterizes the
mapping of the abilities to sectoral employment under both these cases:
Proposition 4.1. (a) When êhj > ê
m







j ) : i ∈ A
[êmj , ẽ
h
j ) : i ∈ M
[ẽhj , ēj ] : i ∈ H
b) When êhj < ê
m







j ) : i ∈ A
[êhj , ẽ
m
j ) : i ∈ H
[ẽmj , ēj ] : i ∈ H
Proof. (a) When êmj < ê
h






j . The distribution
of ability types across the three sectors in this case follows directly from equations 4.1, 4.2, 4.3,
and Lemma 4.1. Ability types below êmj remain unskilled and work in sector-a while those in
between êmj and ê
h




j , equation 4.3 implies that
employment in sector-m is strictly preferred to sector-h. Those with ability above ẽhj choose to
work in sector-h, which follows directly from equation 4.3.
(b) When êhj < ê
m






j . In this case, the distribution of
ability types across sectors follows directly from equations 4.1-4.2 and Lemma 4.1. Ability types
below êhj strictly prefer employment in sector-a to both sectors h and m. For all ability types in
caste j = n, s with e ∈ [êhj , ê
m
j ), employment in sector-h dominates both sectors a and m. For
e ≥ êmj > ẽ
h
j , equation 4.1 says that sector-m dominates sector-a while equation 4.3 says that
working in sector-h is strictly preferred by these types over sector-m employment.
While the message of Proposition 4.1 is self-explanatory, a comment on part (b), which describes
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allocations when êhj < ê
m
j , is useful. The ability distribution described in Proposition 4.1 for this
case implies that labor from both castes choose employment in either sector-a or sector-h, thereby
rendering sector-m empty. This is clearly counterfactual since our data analysis revealed that both
castes were employed in all three sectors. In the remainder of the paper we ignore this case and
focus exclusively on parameter configurations such that êhj > ê
m
j for j = n, s.
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4.2 Market clearing and Equilibrium
Markets for each good must clear individually. Hence, we must have
ca = ya (4.4)
cm = ym − F (4.5)
ch = yh (4.6)
where F denotes the total skill acquisition costs incurred by workers employed in sector m and
sector h, while ya, ym and yh denote aggregate output of goods a,m and h, respectively. The
market clearing condition for the m good recognizes that part of the use of the good is for acquiring
skills.
Definition: The Walrasian equilibrium for this economy is a vector of prices {pm, ph} and quan-
tities
{








such that all worker-households satisfy their
optimality conditions, budget constraints are satisfied and all markets clear.
In subsection 9.2 of Section 9 we describe the derivation of the aggregate variables of the model
and its equilibrium construction.
5 A two-sector illustration
A key motivation for this paper is to understand the effects of productivity growth on the macroe-
conomy and caste gaps. In order to gain some analytical insights on this issue, we now specialize the
three-sector model developed above to the two-sector case. In particular, we assume that there are
only two sectors – a and m, i.e., we eliminate the h sector. We should note that in this two-sector
example there is only one cut-off ability threshold for each group. Hence, in the following we drop
the sectoral superscripts from the notation for the thresholds and use êj to denote the threshold




j is possible but clearly non-generic. Consequently, we ignore this pathological possibility.
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ability of caste j = s, n so that all individuals with ability levels greater than êj will get skilled in
order to work in the m−sector.
We also impose two additional assumptions:
Assumption 1’ : The skill acquisition cost is given by fj (e) = φ (γj − αe) for j = s, n with
γj > αēj .




for j = s, n.
Assumption 1’ imposes linearity on the skill cost function with the marginal effect of ability on
the cost assumed to be identical for both castes and sectors. This is clearly a very restrictive
assumption which we shall relax in the quantitative exercises below. We impose it here to facilitate
some analytical insights. Crucially though, this specification allows the intercept term on the cost
function to vary by sector and caste. The condition γj > αē
j ensures that getting skilled involves
a positive cost for even the highest ability type. Assumption 3 imposes the uniform distribution
for ability which just makes the analytics simple.13






In other words, the relative sectoral ability thresholds of the two groups are proportional to their
relative fixed costs of acquiring skills to work in that sector. Crucially, the conditions say that the
ability cutoff of caste n for working in sector m will be greater than the corresponding cutoff for
caste s if and only if their fixed skill costs exceed the corresponding cost for caste s.


















These variables are given by equations (9.20), (9.21) and (9.23) in the Appendix (without the
13It is important to recognize that the assumption that ability is uniformly distributed does not imply that the
distribution of skills or the distribution of sectoral employment will be uniform as well. Since skills are acquired based
on both costs and ability, the equilibrium skill distribution will not, in general, inherit the distribution of abilities.
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h-sector terms).
The first equation above is the market clearing condition for the agricultural good while the
second equation gives the ability threshold for group s members to get skilled in order to work in
sector m. The third equation comes from the relation zs (ês) = zn (ên). Under the assumed linear
skill cost technology, this condition implies that the relative ability thresholds of the two castes are
proportional to the relative fixed costs of getting skilled.
Note that in this case sectoral outputs and total skill expenditure are



















































































A key question of interest to us is whether the aggregate changes in the Indian economy over
the past two decades can explain, at least qualitatively, the wage and education convergence across
the castes. Toward that end, we define
A = µĀ (5.7)
M = µM̄ (5.8)
This specification nests sectoral and aggregate productivity changes with changes in µ being aggre-
gate shocks while changes in Ā and M̄ are sector-specific productivity shocks. Moreover, to avoid





If the skill acquisition cost were not indexed to the aggregate productivity parameter µ, the cost
of acquiring skills would become progressively smaller as a share of total output of the economy
simply in response to aggregate productivity growth. The specification avoids this scale effect of
growth.
In order to determine the effect of aggregate productivity growth on the economy, it is useful
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Figure 8: An aggregate productivity shock
to define the following:
p̂m =
Aês











Figure 8 plots the two equations. Clearly, p̂m is a downward sloping function of ês while p̃m is
an upward sloping function. The equilibrium threshold ability is ê∗s. All ability types above this




ês, so this solves for the ability threshold for type-n individuals as well.
Our primary interest is in determining the effect of an aggregate productivity shock on this
economy. The following Lemma summarize the effects of a common productivity shock on the
ability threshold ês:
Lemma 5.3. An increase in aggregate labor productivity µ decreases the ability threshold ês.
Proof. The lemma follows by equating equations 5.10 and 5.11 and totally differentiating the re-
sultant expression with respect to ês and µ.
The logic behind Lemma 5.3 is easiest to describe using Figure 8 which shows the effect of an
aggregate TFP shock on the equilibrium system of equations 5.10-5.11. A rise in µ leaves the p̂m
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locus unchanged but shifts the p̃m locus up and to the left. As a result the equilibrium threshold
ability level ês declines. Intuitively, the aggregate TFP shock leaves unchanged the relative gains
and losses from getting skilled since the productivity of all sectors (including the education sector)
are affected symmetrically. However, a higher µ raises the aggregate supply of the agricultural good
net of the subsistence amount c̄L while leaving the aggregate supply of the manufacturing good
net of the training cost unchanged. The resultant excess supply of the agricultural good induces
a terms of trade worsening of the agricultural good. As agents increase their demand for good m
its relative price pm rises. All else equal, this increases the attractiveness of working in sector-m.
Consequently, the threshold ability falls and agents with lower ability now begin to get trained.
This effect is stronger for caste-s as there are more of them in sector-a in the initial equilibrium.
The experiment above focused on aggregate productivity shocks that are balanced or propor-
tional across all sectors. What would happen instead if productivity changes are biased against the
agricultural sector, a feature that characterizes India during this period? Specifically, suppose A
remains unchanged while M rises. The direct effect of this shock would be to shift the p̂m schedule
down and to the left while simultaneously shifting the p̃m schedule down and to the right. The
effect of these changes would be an unambiguous decline in the relative price of the manufacturing
good. The effect on ês is ambiguous and depends on the net strength of the two shifts. The key
feature to note though is that the structure is perfectly consistent with both an improvement in
the agricultural terms of trade as well as an increase in the share of each group getting skilled.
Before closing this section, we analyze a special case of the model to highlight the power of
growth in reducing historical caste gaps. We consider the case where the ability distribution of the
two castes being identical. Specifically, assume that
ēn = ēs = ē; en = es = e


























































, it is easy to check from equation (5.12) that when the ability distributions are
identical, ∆W ≷ 1 as γn ≶ γs. This is intuitive. If the ability distributions are identical for the two
castes then the only reason for there to be any difference in their average wages would be differences
in skilling costs. If the fixed costs of getting skilled are greater for caste s then a relatively smaller
fraction of caste s acquires the skills to work in the relatively high wage non-agriculture sector. As
a result, their average wages are lower.
Proposition 5.2. When ēn = ēs = ē; en = es = e, the conditions γn ≤ γs and γs ≥ 2αē are jointly
sufficient for an increase in aggregate labor productivity µ to weakly reduce the wage gap ∆W .
Proof. The proposition follows from differentiating equation (5.12) with respect ês which gives that
∆W is a weakly decreasing function of ês under the two jointly sufficient conditions. The rest of
the proposition follows directly from Lemma 5.3.
Proposition 5.2 is striking in that it shows that even when castes have equal ability and SC/STs
have a higher relative fixed cost of acquiring skills, a fall in the threshold ability cutoff ê induced
by higher productivity growth would reduce the relative caste wage gap as long as the fixed cost of
skilling is large enough. Intuitively, higher productivity reduces the fixed costs of skilling. These
gains are proportionately greater for the group with the higher fixed cost. Hence, a relatively larger
fraction of caste s workers get skilled and transit to sector m which reduces the overall wage gap.
6 A Quantitative Evaluation
We now turn to a quantitative implementation of the full version of the three-sector model. Specif-
ically, we examine whether a calibrated version of the three sector model can explain the observed
caste gap dynamics through the observed macroeconomic growth; and whether the caste education
subsidization in India through reservations were crucial for the observed convergence.
The quantitative strategy of this section is to calibrate the model to the mimic the 1983 distri-
bution of skills and sectoral output. Next, we estimate the sectoral productivity changes from the
National Income and Product Accounts data and feed those estimated paths into the calibrated
model. The resulting distributional implications of the model at each date are then compared to
the data in order to evaluate the explanatory power of aggregate productivity shocks for the caste
wage gap dynamics.
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While we stick to the functional forms outlined in the previous sections, we make one change
here in that we change Assumption 1’ to









for j = s, n and k = m,h.
Two comments on this change in the specification of the skill acquisition costs are in order. First,
this specification switches the cost function for skill acquisition from linear to quadratic. This is
a more flexible specification that allows a better fit of the model to the data. Second, the cost
function isn’t scaled to productivity levels in the other sectors of the economy. This is in contrast
to the specification in equation 5.9 above. Without scaling, productivity growth in the other sectors
will reduce the relative education costs. This will potentially create an independent transmission
mechanism of productivity shocks to aggregate output. We explore the quantitative effects of
scaling φ in Section 6.3.4 below.
Table 2: Calibration of Key Variables
Variable Value Variable Value
c 0.5 θ 0.46
η 0.15 α 1






S 0.25 L 1















Notes: The table gives the parameters used for
calibrating the model. The top panel lists the
parameter values that were taken from other
studies. The parameters in the bottom panel
of the table were picked to match data moments
from 1983.
Our focus is on six key data moments: the three sectoral occupation distribution gaps and the
three sectoral wage gaps between non-SCSTs and SCSTs. Our calibration strategy is to choose

















parameter φ for the skilling cost functions to match the six sectoral occupation and wage gaps
between the castes in 1983. We then freeze these parameters at the 1983 values and recompute the
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equilibrium by feeding in the observed change in sectoral labor productivity between 1983 and 2012.
Note that since the model has no intrinsic dynamics, each new level for productivity generates a
new equilibrium.
Table 2 reports the key parameters. The upper panel of the table gives the parameters that were
either normalizations or values that were taken from other studies. The numbers in the lower panel
are the ones that were calibrated to match the moments of the 1983 caste distribution. A couple of
features of the parameter values reported above are worth highlighting. First, the absolute levels of
the ability supports for SCSTs are unimportant. The crucial objects instead are the relative ability
mark-ups of non-SCSTs at the lower and upper supports of the ability distribution.
Table 3 below shows the match between the targeted variables under the calibration in Table 2
and their corresponding data values in 1983. Two features in the Table are worth noting. First, the
model fits the rank order and magnitudes of the sectoral caste gaps in both labor shares and wages
gaps quite well. Thus, both in the model and in the data the gaps are the lowest in agriculture and
the highest in services. Second, the model is able to get quite close to the overall caste wage gap
in 1983 in the data despite it not being a targeted moment of the calibration.
Table 3: Data and Model Moments
1983 2012
Variable Data Model Data Model
∆sa 0.80 0.89 0.79 0.94
∆sm 1.43 1.40 1.57 1.35
∆sh 1.61 1.68 1.21 0.98
∆wa 1.04 1.04 1.08 1.04
∆wm 1.20 1.25 1.14 1.25
∆wh 1.45 1.32 1.33 1.32
∆w 1.45 1.27 1.30 1.17
Notes: The table reports the sectoral caste gaps in
employment and wages. ∆sj , j = a,m, h is the ratio
of the fraction of all of all non-SC/STs working in
sector j to the fraction of all SC/STs working in sector
j. ∆wj , j = a,m, h is the ratio of the mean non-
SC/ST to mean SC/ST wage in sector j. ∆w is the
ratio of the mean non-SC/ST to mean SC/ST wage.
Having described the fit of the model to the targeted data moments in 1983, we now examine
its dynamic predictions for caste gaps. We are specifically interested in examining the predicted
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paths of the caste gaps in sectoral labor shares and wages over time in response to the actual
sectoral productivity changes since 1983.
Table 3 also gives the labor and wage gaps across castes in the model and the data in 2012. The
main takeaway from the Table is in the last row. The wage gap between non-SC/STs and SC/STs
declined by 0.15/1.45 or 10.5 percent between 1983 and 2012 in the data. The corresponding
reduction generated by the model is 7.9 percent. Thus, the baseline model with quadratic skilling
costs can explain 75 percent of the observed decline in the percentage wage gap.
Underneath the success in reproducing the overall caste wage gap dynamics, the model has
mixed success in matching the sectoral dynamics in wages and employment shares. While the sec-
toral caste wage gaps did exhibit some changes in the data, the model predicts relatively unchanged
sectoral wage gaps. However, the model has both qualitative and quantitative success in generating
the observed dynamics of the caste gaps in sectoral employment shares.
As we showed through the decomposition exercise, the size of the change in the caste labor share
gap in services was the largest amongst all the sectoral gaps, and the key driver of the overall wage
convergence in the data. The model delivers on this margin by generating a 42 percent reduction in
the labor share gap in service between 1983 and 2012. While this overshoots the actual 25 percent
decline in the data by, it allows the model to reproduce the overall wage gap dynamics.
The labor share gap in agriculture remained relatively stable both in the data and the model.
Where the model misses is in matching the change in the labor share gap in manufacturing. In the
data this gap actually increased by 9.8 percent while the model generates a 3.6 percent reduction.
A key feature of the data is that there was a switch between the relative rank orders of the labor
share gaps between manufacturing and services. While services had the largest caste gap in labor
shares in 1983, by 2012 it was manufacturing that had the largest caste labor share gap. The model
successfully reproduces this switch.
How well does the model reproduce the aggregate dynamics of the Indian economy during this
period? Table 4 describes the dynamic behavior of the sectoral shares of labor in agriculture,
manufacturing and services (La/L, Lm/L and Lh/L, respectively) along with the relative sectoral
prices of manufacturing and services (pM and pH , respectively). The results for the baseline model
are shown in the last column of Table 4 under the c = 0.5. Both the model and the data pre-
dict decreases in the labor shares of agriculture and manufacturing and a decline in the prices of
manufacturing and services relative to agriculture.
It is important to note that these aggregate results are not sensitive to the presence of non-
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Table 4: Sectoral Price and Labor Shares
Growth rate 1983-2012










pm -0.323 -0.509 -0.529
ph -0.264 -0.578 -0.593
Notes: The table reports the rate of change in sec-
toral labor shares and sectoral relative prices. Lj
denotes labor employed in sector j and L is total
labor employed. pj , j = m,h denotes the sector j
price relative to sector a.
homotheticities since the same pattern emerges when c = 0. It is also worth noting that that
standard structural transformation in models with non-homotheticities predict deteriorating agri-
cultural terms of trade. That is clearly not consistent with the Indian data but a feature that
our model can match. We shall show below that the key for our model to match these sectoral
dynamics is differential sectoral growth.
6.1 Deconstructing the wage convergence
In order to understand the source of wage convergence across the castes in the model, note that
rising sectoral productivities induces a fall in the thresholds êmk , ẽ
h
k , k = n, s. A decrease in the
threshold causes workers to flow from one sector to another. The size of these flows depends on (a)
the number of people to the left of the threshold; (b) the elasticity of the distribution function of
abilities around the threshold; and (c) how much the threshold changes. Castes can differ on all or
any of (a), (b) and (c) above. The effect on the caste wage gap ultimately depends on the relative
magnitudes of these effects and the differences in sectoral productivities.
To see these mechanisms at play, it is useful to write the wage gap in general terms. Recall
that the caste wage gap is ∆w = wn
ws
. Using Gk(e) to denote the cumulative distribution function
of ability for caste k = n, s with the associated probability density function gk(e), the mean wage































































For given sectoral relative prices and productivities, the caste specific wages can be differentiated
and rearranged to get the percent change in the caste wage gap in response to percent changes in







































































































, k = n, s
denote the elasticities of the CDF of the ability of caste k at the thresholds êmk and ẽ
h
k .
To see the different forces at work, recall that changes in sectoral labor productivities alter the
ability thresholds êmk and ẽ
h
j for k = n, s. Changes in these thresholds change the output produced
by the two types of workers. The magnitude of this effect for each caste depends on the product of
the marginal effect of moving a worker at the threshold from one sector to another and the total
movement of workers of that caste across sectors due to the change in the threshold.
For example, an increase in the threshold êmk changes the proportion of caste k = n, s working
in sector m by the elasticity ηmk of the CDF Gk at the threshold weighted by the fraction of workers






, in turn, is the marginal net effect on output of moving
a worker of caste k with ability êmk from sector m to sector a, expressed relative to the average










k ) is the total effect on output
produced by caste k = n, s due to a change in the ability threshold êmk by one percent.
Since A−pmM is common to both castes, the difference in the output effect of changing ê
m
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k ). The effects of changes in
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. Hence, the sign of d∆w∆w depends
on the terms in the curly brackets in both lines of equation (6.13). Under the assumed uniform
distributions for ability, the elasticities ηk(e), k = n, s are decreasing in e. The calibration also
implies that Gn(ê
m





























, the terms in the curly brackets in equation (6.13) are negative.
Under our calibration A < pmM < phH in 1983. This, along with the fact that the terms
in the curly brackets are negative, imply that the caste wage gap moves in the same direction of
the ability thresholds. In the quantitative model, rising sectoral productivities reduce the ability
thresholds for both castes. Hence, the overall caste wage gap falls.
Intuitively, the higher ability thresholds for caste-n implies a lower elasticity of their CDF around
the thresholds. When the thresholds fall proportionately for both groups, the smaller numbers of
type-n workers below the thresholds along with the smaller increase of their probability weight on
higher productivity sectors due to the lower elasticity mean that the shares of type-n workers in
sectors m and h increase at slower rates than the corresponding expansion of employment shares
of type-s workers in these sectors. This is the primary driver of the overall wage convergence.
Put differently, the overall caste wage convergence in the model is driven primarily by SC/STs
switching to higher wage sectors faster than non-SC/ST workers. Within-sector wage convergence
plays a very minor role since the ability thresholds of the castes move similarly.
6.2 Robustness to alternative productivity growth measures
The exogenous driver of dynamic changes in our model are the sectoral labor productivity growth
rates. As we had showed in the empirics above, there are variations in the estimated labor produc-
tivity numbers produced by different data sources. Specifically, we had seen in Figure 4 that the
sectoral productivity growth rates estimated in the KLEMS dataset were lower than the produc-
tivity numbers estimated from the national accounts statistics. How robust are our convergence
results to using the lower productivity growth numbers from KLEMS?
Table 5 reports the caste labor and wage gaps by sector for 2012. The second column reports
the data moments for 2012, the third column gives the moments from the baseline model while
the last column gives the predicted numbers for 2012 under the alternative productivity growth
estimates from the KLEMS dataset. The lower productivity growth estimates in KLEMS induces
marginal changes in the predicted sectoral caste labor gaps but leaves the predicted sectoral caste
wage gaps unchanged. The joint effect of these changes is that the predicted decline in the overall
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Table 5: Alternative Productivity Growth Estimates
2012
Variable Data Baseline KLEMS
∆sa 0.79 0.94 0.93
∆sm 1.57 1.35 1.27
∆sh 1.21 0.98 1.05
∆wa 1.08 1.04 1.04
∆wm 1.14 1.25 1.25
∆wh 1.33 1.33 1.33
∆w 1.30 1.17 1.19
The table reports the moments from the model
computed under sectoral labor productivity
growth for 1983-2012 computed from the na-
tional accounts of India and from the KLEMS
dataset release 2020.
caste wage gap is very slightly lower under the KLEMS estimates relative to the baseline. This
suggests to us that the results are robust to alternative estimates of productivity growth.
We view these results as being broadly supportive of the baseline model in explaining the static
and dynamic patterns in both the overall caste wage gap and sectoral labor gaps. While the model
has difficulty in reproducing the observed dynamics of the sectoral wage gaps, the key to the overall
wage convergence is the dynamic behavior of the sectoral labor gaps across castes, especially in
services, a feature that the model generates successfully.
6.3 Mechanisms at Play
The model developed and quantified above has a few important features built into it. These include
selection effects in sectoral choices by workers, non-homothetic preferences, education costs as well
as differential sectoral productivity growth. While the education costs are more specific to our
model, selection effects, non-homothetic preferences and unbalanced sectoral growth have been
emphasized by a number of authors in models of structural transformation.
Which of these features is key for our baseline results? We try to uncover the answer by re-
solving the quantitative model under combinations of four special cases: (a) random sorting of
workers across sectors; (b) homothetic preferences with c = 0; (c) balanced sectoral labor produc-
tivity growth with productivity growth rates equalized across sectors at the rate of the observed
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agricultural labor productivity growth;14 and (d) education costs that are scaled to the growth rate
labor productivity in agriculture. Recall that not scaling skilling costs implies that education costs
decline in relative terms as productivity grows in the other sectors. This induces an endogenous
expansion of output as more people get skilled.
6.3.1 Random sorting: No selection effects
In the first special case of the model, we shut down all selection effects in the sectoral re-sorting
of workers in 2012 in response to productivity shocks. Specifically, we feed the same sectoral
productivity growth as in the baseline model but instead of allowing workers to endogenously make
their skilling and sectoral employment choices in response, we assign random selections of workers
from agriculture to manufacturing and from manufacturing to services. The random selections are
done such that the overall shares of workers of each caste changing sectors in 2012 relative to 1983
matches the corresponding shares in the baseline model.
This experiment effectively keeps the number of workers changing sectors the same as in the
baseline model but does not permit any selection effects to dictate the identity of those changing
sectors. The results are shown in Table 6.
The main takeaway can be gleaned from the row corresponding to ∆W in the top panel which
gives the overall caste wage gaps in the different cases. While in the baseline model with selection
the caste wage gap falls by 8 percent (0.102/1.274), the corresponding decline under random sorting
is 6 percent (0.076/1.274). Clearly, labor flows across sectors are the key driver of wage convergence.
Selection effects, while present, have relatively smaller effects. This is consistent with our statistical
decomposition exercise where we had found that sectoral caste labor convergence was the main
contributor to the overall wage convergence.
The effects of selection are illustrated by the last two columns of the other panels of Table 6.
When labor is reassigned across sectors randomly rather than through selection the average ability
of both castes rises in agriculture while falling in the other two sectors. This is intuitive. Under
selection, only the most able types move from agriculture to manufacturing. When the re-sorting
is random, the average ability of the group that moves from agriculture is lower. This raises the
average ability of the pool that remains in agriculture while simultaneously reducing the average
ability of the new pool of workers in manufacturing. A similar force explains the decline of the
14The results presented below are not sensitive to choosing the rate of labor productivity of one of the other two
sectors as the common growth rate.
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Table 6: Wage Gaps with Random Resorting
Wage Gaps and Growth
Variable Baseline 1983 Baseline 2012 Random Sorting 2012
∆W a 1.0394 1.0382 < 1.0403
∆Wm 1.2452 1.2492 < 1.3920
∆W h 1.3238 1.3247 > 1.3012
∆W 1.2740 1.1720 < 1.1974
Sectoral average ability
Eeanst 1.4601 1.3992 < 1.4615
Eemnst 2.3395 2.1934 > 2.0066
Eehnst 2.6126 2.5302 > 2.4804
Eeast 1.4048 1.3465 < 1.4049
Eemst 1.8779 1.7563 > 1.4415
Eehst 1.9729 1.9099 > 1.9062
Output and Price
Y a 1.0710 1.8466 < 1.9283
Y m 2.9324 8.8260 > 7.9371
Y h 1.1226 6.5094 > 6.4048
pm 0.1755 0.0827 < 0.1080
ph 0.4312 0.1754 < 0.1891
average ability of service sector workers of both castes under random sorting.
The altered sectoral composition of workers under random sorting has macroeconomic implica-
tions. The higher average ability of agricultural workers raises agricultural output in 2012 relative
to the baseline. The corresponding output levels of manufacturing and services declines due to the
declining ability pool of their workers. This raises the sectoral relative prices of manufacturing and
services relative to the baseline case.
The relatively muted selection effects in the model is due to our assumption that ability is
uniformly distributed. Assuming a Pareto distribution for ability would likely raise the contribution
of selection effects. However, it is worth recalling that the presence of skilling costs in the model
induces Pareto distributions for education and sectoral employment despite the uniform distribution
for abilities. We view this feature to be a strength of the model. Since ability is private information,
heaping a large part of the explanation on a Pareto distribution of an unobservable would potentially
be problematic.
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6.3.2 Non-homothetic Preferences
Next, we examine the importance of non-homothetic preferences in generating the results. The
last column of Table 7 gives the relevant changes in the caste labor and wage gaps between 1983
and 2012 predicted by the model under our baseline calibration where we have non-homothetic
preferences (c = 0.5), differential sectoral productivity growth and no scaling of the skilling costs.
The main result to note is that non-homotheticity is quantitatively not important in generating
the caste wage convergence. Comparing the changes in the overall caste wage gap for c = 0 and
c = 0.5 for common sectoral growth under scaled skilling costs shows that the predicted changes in
the wage gaps are quite similar (0 and -1.41 percent, respectively). Similarly, the predicted changes
under c = 0 and c = 0.5 for common sectoral growth when skilling costs are not scaled are also
very similar (-6.87% and -6.44%).
Table 7: Assessment of Different Mechanisms
Percentage Growth Rate 1983-2012
Common Growth Differential Growth
Scaled skill costs Unscaled skill costs Scaled skill costs Unscaled skill costs
Variable Data c = 0 c = 0.5 c = 0 c = 0.5 c = 0 c = 0.5 c = 0 c = 0.5
∆sa −1.52% 0% 4.72% 2.51% 5.73% 2.09% 5.66% 3.84% 6.21%
∆sm 9.37% 0% −21.41% 6.18% −14.04% 4.77% −15.87% 17.46% −3.16%
∆sh −24.37% 0% −15.92% −27.43% −35.91% −24.77% −34.03% −35.50% −42.09%
∆wa 4.12% 0% −0.08% 0% −0.11% 0.01% −0.10% 0.01% −0.12%
∆wm −5.00% 0% 0.34% 0.12% 0.34% 0.11% 0.35% 0.16% 0.33%
∆wh −8.19% 0% 0.01% 0% 0% 0.05% 0% 0.11% 0%
∆w −10.51% 0% −1.41% −6.87% −6.44% −6.09% −5.91% −9.28% −8.01%
Notes: The table reports the percent changes in sectoral caste gaps in employment and wages between 1983 and
2012. ∆sj , j = a,m, h is the ratio of the fraction of all of all non-SC/STs working in sector j to the fraction
of all SC/STs working in sector j. ∆wj , j = a,m, h is the ratio of the mean non-SC/ST to mean SC/ST wage
in sector j. ∆w is the ratio of the mean non-SC/ST to mean SC/ST wage.
These results do not imply that homothetic preferences are irrelevant in the model. As can
be seen from the column for c = 0 in the common sectoral growth rate panel, both labor and
wage caste gaps remain unaffected by growth when preferences are homothetic. Since all sectors
expand proportionately under balanced growth, and demand grows proportionately as well due to
homotheticity, relative sectoral prices remain unchanged in this case. This leaves the caste-specific
ability cut-offs for switching sectors unaffected by growth. Consequently, caste gaps are invariant
to growth. Introducing non-homotheticity changes this as growth induces unbalanced demand
increases across sectors. The resultant changes in sectoral relative prices affect the ability thresholds
but it only induces a small reduction in the overall caste wage gap. Hence, the quantitative effect
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of non-homotheticity is small.
6.3.3 Differential Sectoral Labor Productivity Growth
Table 7 also illustrates the key role played by differential sectoral productivity growth in inducing
the wage convergence. Even with homothetic preferences and scaled skilling costs, the observed
sectoral productivity growth rates imply a 6.09% reduction in the overall caste wage gap. In
addition to the differential sectoral productivity growth, if we also remove the scaling of skilling
costs and introduce non-homothetic preferences, the caste wage gap declines by an additional 1.9
percentage points, taking the overall decrease of the wage gap to 8.01%. Clearly, differential sectoral
productivity growth seems to be key for the caste convergence.
6.3.4 Scaling of Skilling Costs
In the quantitative implementation of the model, we did not scale up the costs of skilling with
productivity growth in the agriculture, manufacturing and services (see the discussion following
Assumption 1” above). The non-scaling effectively reduces relative skilling costs when productivity
grows in the other three sectors. This mechanism acts as a form of endogenous propagation of
exogenous productivity shocks.
Table 7 shows that unscaled skilling costs do have quantitatively strong effects on the overall
caste convergence. Comparing the results for scaled and unscaled skilling costs for otherwise iden-
tical growth and homotheticity specifications of the model shows that there is a sharp increase in
the wage convergence when skilling costs remain unscaled. Clearly, this endogenous propagation
mechanism is quantitatively strong.
7 Counterfactual experiments
Having described the fit of the model to the 1983 sectoral labor and wage gaps across castes, we
now turn to the issue of identifying the key drivers of the observed dynamics in these gaps. Two
questions are of particular interest to us. We examine them below.
7.1 Re-sorting of workers
A key narrative surrounding the issue of castes in India is that it often acts as a barrier to entry into
different occupations and sectors. In our model, productivity changes induce a sectoral re-sorting
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of workers based on their cost of skill acquisition and sectoral wages. How important was this
re-sorting for the declining caste gaps?
We assess the importance of sectoral sorting by workers by conducting a counterfactual exper-
iment wherein we subject the model to the same observed sectoral productivity shocks as in the
baseline case but keep the sectoral labor choice of workers of all castes fixed at the 1983 values.
Hence, the only changes over time in worker wages under this experiment will be due to changes
in sectoral productivity since the sectoral worker composition remains unchanged.
The last column of Table 8 shows the the sectoral labor and wage gaps along with the overall
caste wage gap in 2012 when sectoral allocations are frozen at the 1983 levels. The last column
and row of the table reveals that without any labor re-sorting across sectors, sectoral productivity
growth alone would have induced a widening of the relative caste wage gap from 1.27 to 1.30. The
reason for this is that productivity growth was faster in the non-agricultural sectors where SC/STs
were under-represented in 1983. Without the possibility of reallocation of SC/ST labor towards the
faster growing sectors, the overall wage gap increases even though each sectoral wage gap remains
unchanged in this case since the relative worker abilities of the two types in each sector remains
constant.
This result shows the importance of re-sorting of workers across sectors for the caste wage
convergence. The importance of growth for narrowing inter-group inequality arises due to the fact
that it encourages workers to re-optimize their sector of employment in accordance with comparative
advantage based on their ability.
7.2 Importance of Affirmative Action Policies
As we noted in the introduction to the paper, India has had affirmative action protection en-
shrined in the constitution with reservations extended to SC/STs in seats in public institutions of
tertiary education, in public sector employment and in political representation. In terms of the
model developed in this paper, our proxy for reservations for SC/STs is the lower cost of getting
skilled in order to access manufacturing and service sector employment. How important were these
reservation policies for the observed caste convergence between 1983 and 2012?
We examine the importance of reservations by making one change to the baseline model. Specif-








= 1 while leaving γmn and γ
h
n at their baseline levels. In other words, we
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Table 8: Counterfactual Experiments
1983 2012
Variable Data Baseline Equal costs Data Baseline Equal costs No re-sorting
∆sa 0.80 0.89 0.67 0.79 0.94 0.65 0.89
∆sm 1.43 1.40 ∞ 1.57 1.35 2.05 1.40
∆sh 1.61 1.68 ∞ 1.21 0.98 ∞ 1.68
∆wa 1.04 1.04 0.94 1.08 1.04 0.92 1.04
∆wm 1.20 1.25 ∞ 1.14 1.25 1.07 1.25
∆wh 1.45 1.32 ∞ 1.33 1.32 ∞ 1.32
∆w 1.45 1.27 1.54 1.30 1.17 1.31 1.30
Notes: The table reports the sectoral caste gaps in employment and wages in 1983 and
2012 in the data and under different special cases of the model. ∆sj , j = a,m, h, is the
ratio of the fraction of all of all non-SC/STs working in sector j to the fraction of all
SC/STs working in sector j. ∆wj , j = a,m, h is the ratio of the mean non-SC/ST to
mean SC/ST wage in sector j. ∆w is the ratio of the mean non-SC/ST to mean SC/ST
wage.
raise the fixed cost component of skilling costs for SC/STs to non-SC/STs levels in each sector
thereby eliminating the advantage of reservations for SC/STs. All the other baseline calibration
parameters are left unchanged.
The column “Equal cost” in the left panel of Table 8 shows the effect of this re-calibration on
the computed moments for 1983. SC/ST share of employment in the non-agricultural sectors goes
to zero as they all switch to the agricultural sector. Compared to the baseline, the caste wage
gap in agriculture declines as a result of SC/STs with relatively higher ability than the incumbent
SC/STs switching to agriculture. The net effect of this re-sorting of workers is that the overall
caste wage gap widens to 1.54. This is a 21 percent increase in the caste wage gap relative to the
baseline case.
The effects of equalizing skilling costs on the caste gaps in 2012 are shown in the right panel of
Table 8 under the column “Equal Costs”. The sectoral productivity growths during 1983-2012 does
make manufacturing employment attractive for some higher ability SC/STs in 2012. However, the
services sector continues to remain unpopulated by SC/STs. The overall caste wage gap in 2012 is
1.31, which is 11 percent higher than the wage gap of 1.17 in the baseline case.
The higher caste wage gaps in 1983 and 2012 predicted by the model due to equalizing skilling
costs across castes suggest that reservations in higher education did succeed in reducing caste
wage gaps. The policy likely worked by inducing some relatively higher ability SC/STs to take
advantage of the lower education costs and move out of agriculture to take up employment in the
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non-agricultural sectors with higher wages. Without these reservations in higher education, the
caste wage gaps would have been higher at all points.
We should note that it is slightly tricky to compare the reductions in the caste wage gaps
between 1983 and 2012 implied by the model with and without reservations. In the absence of
reservations, the SC/STs completely exit the manufacturing and services sectors in 1983. This
lowers their mean wage a lot in 1983 and thus raises the implied percentage decrease in the caste
wage gap during 1983-2012 due to this base effect.
The impact of base effects on assessing the dynamic effects of reservations can be seen through
three different comparisons. If one compares caste wage gaps in 1983 under equal skilling costs
(∆w = 1.54) with the corresponding gap in 2012 with equal skilling costs (∆w = 1.31), the implied
reduction in the caste wage gap between 1983 and 2012 is 14.9 percent.
On the other hand, if we compare the caste wage gap in 1983 in the baseline case with reser-
vations (∆w = 1.27) with the caste gap in 2012 with equal skilling costs (∆w = 1.31), the implied
reduction in the caste wage gap is −3.1 percent. The latter experiment corresponds to a counter-
factual where 2012 differs from 1983 along two dimensions: sectoral labor productivity and skilling
costs. It is thus a joint shock which results in a widening of the overall caste wage gap. Effec-
tively, removing reservations in education more than offset the wage gains of SC/STs due to higher
sectoral productivities.
The main takeaway from these “equal costs” counterfactual experiments is that for given pro-
ductivity levels, removal of reservations for SC/STs induce an increase in the caste wage gap. In
this sense, the educational reservations policy in India that have been in effect since the 1950s have
indeed raised the average wages of SC/STs by facilitating their access to higher wage employment.
8 Conclusion
The past three decades have seen a significant convergence in the education attainments, occupation
choices and wages of scheduled castes and tribes (SC/STs) in India to toward the corresponding
levels of non-SC/STs. In this paper we have examined the possibility that the large aggregate
changes that were occurring in the Indian economy at this time may have jointly contributed to
both the caste convergence as well as the large scale structural transformation in the economy
observed in the data.
Using a multi-sector, heterogenous agent model we find that sectoral labor productivity increases
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can account for 75 percent of the observed wage convergence between SC/STs and non-SC/STs.
Importantly, the model generates sectoral labor shares and price dynamics that are consistent with
the data for this period. Our statistical decomposition of the overall caste wage gap which identified
the decline in the caste labor gap in services as a key component of the overall wage convergence.
The quantitative model mimics this feature.
While the model incorporates both non-homothetic preferences and differential sectoral pro-
ductivity growth as potential drivers of structural transformation, we find differential sectoral
productivity growth to be key for both the aggregate and caste gap dynamics.
Our counterfactual experiments on the model suggest that the main mechanism driving the caste
convergence was worker re-sorting across sectors. SC/STs, who were severely under-represented
in the manufacturing and service sectors, responded to faster productivity growth by switching
employment disproportionately into the higher paying service sector. Absent this re-sorting, the
caste wage gap would have actually widened despite the productivity growth. We also find that
the net flows of workers across sectors account for 75 percent of the wage convergence generated
by the model while selection effects account for just a quarter of the convergence.
We also find that affirmative action policies that lowered the relative costs of acquiring skills
for SC/STs may have played an important role in raising SC/ST wages by facilitating the training
and entry of relatively higher ability SC/STs into non-agricultural sectors. Absent these policies,
SC/ST representation in the manufacturing and services sectors would have been much lower.
Consequently, the overall caste wage gap would have been much larger in both 1983 and 2012.
It bears stressing however that our baseline results show that even without any change in
affirmative action policies, growth not only raises the wages of all groups but also benefits SC/STs
marginally more as the caste wage gap falls. In a world with no education reservations at any
point, productivity growth reduces the caste wage gap by 14.9 percent. On the other hand, our
baseline model, which has reservations in place throughout, predicts a 8.1 percent decrease in the
caste wage gap in response to sectoral productivity growth. In other words, growth appears to lift
all boats, with or without reservations.
A key primitive in our model is the ability distribution. In a fully dynamic intergenerational
model, the ability distribution for the young would endogenously evolve in response to human
capital bequests from parents which, in turn, would depend on parents’ human capital. Policies
that facilitate access to education for disadvantaged groups would consequently affect the ability
distribution of future generations both directly and indirectly. We intend to return to this issue in
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future work.
The model that we have explored here focused specifically on the costs of acquiring specialized
skills in order to acquire non-agricultural employment. This focus is intended to ascertain the
effects of reservations in higher education for SC/STs which have been provided by the Indian
Constitution. The constitution of India also reserves a fraction of public sector jobs for SC/STS.
We have not focused on that margin here since public sector employment comprises a small share
of overall employment in India.
An important mechanism that we have ignored here is changes in upper caste discrimination
against SC/STs. As is well known from the work of Becker (1957), rising competition can make
discrimination more expensive for business owners. This could reduce barriers for SC/STs and
the caste gaps. To examine this hypothesis we would need to conduct a detailed analysis of more
disaggregated sectoral data to both document changes in the degree of competition and changes in
employment patterns. We hope to examine this in future work.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Data
Table 9 summarizes one-digit industry codes in our dataset. In the presentation in the text we
group these codes further into three broad industry categories: Ind 1 refers to Agriculture, Hunting,
Forestry and Fishing; Ind 2 collects Manufacturing and Mining and Quarrying; while Ind 3 refers
to all Service industries. These groupings are detailed in Table 9.
Table 9: Industry categories
Industry code Industry description Group
A Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry Ind 1
B Fishing Ind 1
C Mining and Quarrying Ind 2
D Manufacturing Ind 2
E Electricity, Gas and Water Supply Ind 3
F Construction Ind 3
G Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor Vehicles, Ind 3
motorcycles and personal and household goods
H Hotels and Restaurants Ind 3
I Transport, Storage and Communications Ind 3
J Financial Intermediation Ind 3
K Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities Ind 3
L Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security Ind 3
M Education Ind 3
N Health and Social Work Ind 3
O Other Community, Social and Personal Service Activities Ind 3
P Private Households with Employed Persons Ind 3
Q Extra Territorial Organizations and Bodies Ind 3
9.2 Model: Optimality Conditions and Aggregation
9.2.1 Household optimality















Using these solutions along with the household’s budget constraint gives
cai = c̄+ θ (ŷi − c̄)
pmc
m
i = η (ŷi − c̄)
phc
h
i = (1− η − θ) (ŷi − c̄)
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9.2.2 Aggregation
There are six variables to aggregate – aggregate consumption of the three types of goods as well as
their aggregate productions. We start with the consumption side. Aggregate consumption of each
good is the sum of the consumptions of the good by each type of household. Recall that there are
three types of households in this economy and that each household opts into only one of the three
available occupations. The solution for cai derived above says that
cai = (1− θ) c̄+ θŷi
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where ss = S, and sn = N represent the population sizes of the two two castes. Similarly, we have































Lastly, since phchi = (1− η − θ) (ŷi − c̄), aggregate consumption of the h good is


























− L (1− η − θ) c̄ (9.16)
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Given the linearity of the production technologies in ability, these are just the conditional means
of the relevant distributions of ability in each sector.




ykj , k = a,m, h














































Note that the aggregation above represents case (b) of Figure 1 above where êhj > ê
m
j . The limits
of integration would have to be altered appropriately for the opposite configuration.
To derive the skill acquisition costs, note that the average costs of skill acquisition by caste j
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where ss = S and sn = N . Summing the costs across the castes then gives the total cost of
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(9.23)
These relationships can then be used in equations (4.4-4.6) to derive the specific market clearing
conditions for the a,m, and h goods. Note that only two of the three market clearing conditions
are free - if two markets clear then the third must clear as well.







n. The four equations that jointly determine these variables are two out of the three
market clearing conditions along with the conditions zms (ê
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Note that the prices pm and ph can be eliminated from this system of equations by using any two
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